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Recent American foreign policy has depended heavily on the use of negative inducements to alter the behavior of other states. From public browbeating through economic sanctions to military invasion, the last several presidents have chosen to use coercion to advance U.S. interests when dealing with adversaries. In this respect, as Miroslav Nincic notes, the United States differs from many of its closest allies: Canada has long maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba, and several of the European democracies have continued diplomatic engagement with governments that the United States considers pariah regimes. In The Logic of Positive Engagement, Nincic outlines the efficacy of and the benefits that can flow from positive rather than negative engagement. -- book jacket

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Economic coercion and foreign policy / Miroslav Nincic and Peter Wallensteen -- On the effects of international economic sanctions: with examples from the case of Rhodesia / Johan Galtung -- Strategies for evading economic sanctions / Jerrold D. Green -- Economic sanctions: ten modern cases and three important lessons / Peter Wallensteen -- Using food power: opportunities, appearances, and damage control / Robert L. Paarlberg -- The vulnerability of modern nations: economic diplomacy in East-West relations / David A. Deese -- The politics of international sanctions: a case study of South Africa / David F. Gordon -- Ideology and the concept of economic security / David J. Sylvan.

Positive inducements as a strategy for dealing with regimes that challenge core norms of international behavior and the national interests of the United States ("renegade regimes") contain both promises and pitfalls. Such inducements, which include policy concessions and economic favors, can serve two main purposes: (1) arranging a beneficial quid pro quo with the other side, and (2) catalyzing, via positive engagement, a restructuring of interests and preferences within the other side's politico-economic system (such that quid pro quos become less and less necessary). The conditions for progress toward either purpose can vary, as can the requirements for sufficient and credible concessions on both sides and the obstacles in the way of such concessions. For renegade regimes, a primary consideration involves the domestic purposes that internationally objectionable behavior can serve. An examination of the cases of North Korea, Iran, and Libya finds that negative pressures have been relatively ineffective, suggesting that more attention should be given to the potential for positive inducements to produce better outcomes.